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For a population, we consider a set L = { 1, . . . , I} of autosomal loci with allele genes aik at the ith locus (1 5 i 5 1, 1 < k 5 mi, rni 1 2). For each gamete g = alkl . .. a&, and each subset U C L, the corresponding subgamete gu is the part of g consisting of a& with i E U.
In particular, gi = a& (1 5 i < 1). Obviously, g = gugv, where V is the subset of those loci which do not belong to U. The partitions U 1 V can be identified with all formally possible crossing-overs. If a crossing-over U 1 V occurs in meiosis then every gamete pair (g, h) produces the recombinant gametes guhv and hugv with equal probabilities r(U 1 V)/2, where r is the linkage distribution. The latter is supposed to be fixed in what follows. By definition, 7-P I V) 2 0,
WV
A state p of the population on the gamete level is a probability distribution p(g) on the set P of all gametes: p(g) 2 0, Cp(g) = 1, where g runs over P. Given some fitness values X(g, h) = X(h,g) 2 0, X(g,g) > 0, the evolutionary equations under the corresponding selection and random mating are Under monomial selection, the equilibrium set is generically finite, and the total number of equilibria does not exceed 31rld1.
The genericity means that the conclusion is true outside a proper algebraic subset of the fitness space.
PROOF.
According to (2) , the set of equilibria is described by equations dg)W(d -Q,(p) = 0, g E r. a system of homogeneous equatiqns of degree 3. In addition, we replace equation (9) by a homogeneous equation of degree 1; namely, we fix a gamete y E r and write CPM -v(7) = 0, (11) cmwith a parameter r.
According to the classical elimination theory, see, e.g., [3] , system (lO),(ll) has a nontrivial complex solution p if and only if the pair (X, r) annihilates all resultants. This condition can be written as a system of algebraic equations where are some polynomials of r with polynomial coefficients R+r (A), Further, we consider two opposite cases. The first of them yields what we need, and the second one leads to a contradiction.
(1) For each 7 E r at least one of polynomials &j,y(X) does not identically vanish.
In this case, the system of equations 
YEr is also a proper algebraic subset. We prove that if a fitness vector X does not belong to A, then the corresponding equilibrium set Ex is finite.
Suppose that EX is infinite. Then, there exists y E l? such that the set {p(r) : p E Ex, p(y) # 0) is infinite. The set EJ, consists of all nonnegative solutions of (8),(g). If p E Ex and p(y) # 0, then p is a nontrivial solution of (lO),(ll) with r = l/p(y). Hence, r = l/p(y) satisfies all equations (12). We see that every equation (12) has infinitely many solutions 7. Hence, X annihilates all coefficients &j,y(X) in (13). By definition of A, we have X E A-,, a fortiori, X E A. Thus, if X @ A, then Ex is finite. (2) There ex&s 7 E r such that all &,y(X, T) are identically zero. Now for every (X, r); system (lO),(ll) has a nontrivial complex solution p. To disprove this, we take T = 0 and specialize X as follows.
Let X+(oij;,aik;) = 0 as long as ji # rki and let all Xi(aiki,aiki) = 1. By (6), X(g,g) = 1 for all g and X(g, h) = 0 for g # h. Note that if guhv = hug", then gv = hU and gv = hv, and hence, g = h. For this reason, the interior sum in (3) reduces to p2(g). The same is true for the whole Qg (p) because of (1). Thus, (10) becomes
Under the restrictions p(g) # 0 and p(h) # 9, (16) yields p(h) = p(g); i.e., p(g) is independent of g for p(g) # 0. Now equation (11) with r = 0 leads to a contradiction: ap(g) = 0 where o is the number of g such that p(g) # 0.
If in Case 1, the number of complex solutions of (8),(g) is finite, then it is at most 31rl-l, by Besout's theorem. Indeed, (9) is a linear equation and the sum of all equations (8) is an identity because of (5) and (9). I COROLLARY.
Under multiplicative selection, the equilibrium set is generic&y finite, and the total number of equilibria does not exceed 31rl-l.
Certainly, the multiplicative case is the most interesting from a biological point of view. However, the restriction to this case does not change the above proof. In fact, our proof requires the only following properties of the selection patterns:
(1) X(g, h) is a polynomial of X(gi, hi), 1 < i I 1; (2) if X(gi, hi) = 0 for some i and some gi # hi, then X(g, h) = 0.
Thus, our result is valid if X(g, h) is a sum (or even a positive linear combination) of monomial functions. For other recent results on finiteness of the equilibrium set see [4, 5] .
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